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Science & Society

Inventive steps: the CRISPR patent dispute
and scientific progress
The recent patent decisions about CRISPR tell us a lot about how advances in biology are actually made—
and how they are not
Jacob S Sherkow

R

ecent decisions by patent offices in
the USA and Europe concerning the
revolutionary gene-editing technology, CRISPR/Cas9, have shed light on the
importance—and puzzles—of one particular
area of patent law: “nonobviousness”, as it
known in the USA, or, in Europe, the
“inventive step”. In February 2017, the US
Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) found
that the work of Feng Zhang, a researcher at
the Broad Institute in Cambridge, MA, USA,
constituted a “nonobvious” advance over
the celebrated work of Jennifer Doudna of
the University of California, Berkeley (USA)
and Emmanuelle Charpentier, then at Umeå
University, Sweden [1]. As a consequence,
the Broad Institute will be able to keep its
US patents covering the technology irrespective of how Doudna and Charpentier’s
patent application proceeds. By contrast, the
European Patent Office (EPO) announced
that it had granted Doudna and Charpentier’s European patent application covering
broad uses of CRISPR/Cas9 in essentially
any cell type, despite the US Patent Office’s
decision to the contrary [2]. Other parties—
including the Broad Institute—will be able
to challenge Doudna and Charpentier’s
European patent. But for now, the EPO’s
decision is an implicit recognition that
Doudna and Charpentier’s work was, itself,
a major “inventive step” over the work that
came before it.
Patent law does not always neatly align
itself with the realities of biological research.
But these competing decisions have put
those differences on parade. The US decision
in particular—and even the nature of the
controversy between the two US research

institutions—has been widely criticized by
scientists. One prominent researcher,
Michael Eisen from the University of California, Berkeley, has taken particular issue
with the PTAB’s articulation of the typical
manner in which molecular biologists adapt
discoveries to different cell systems. “[O]ne
can believe that it was obvious that CRISPR
would work in eukaryotic cells, and still not
expect that it would work the first time
someone tried it or that the process would
be free of frustration”, he wrote on his blog
several days after the US decision. “Because
that’s how science works!”

......................................................

“. . . both patent offices’

decisions are almost certainly
correct as a matter of law if not
the realities of scientific
progress”
......................................................
But both patent offices’ decisions are
almost certainly correct as a matter of law if
not the realities of scientific progress. The
US opinion concerning nonobviousness—
the sine qua non of patentability—is fairly
accurate: Whether prior research “would
have suggested to one of ordinary skill in
the art that [the new] process should be
carried out and would have a reasonable
likelihood of success” [1]. In Europe, one is
entitled to a broad patent on a new technique, if it demonstrates an “inventive step”
over prior methods—even if there no guarantee that it will work for all of its claimed
applications. As noted by a number of intellectual property scholars, this standard

highlights a long-standing division between
science and patent law concerning how
biological research is actually conducted—a
division that is likely to widen as research in
molecular biology advances. This article
briefly explains these differences in patent
law, especially with respect to the law’s critical “nonobviousness” or “inventive step”
requirements, and explains their importance
to CRISPR researchers and molecular biologists of all sorts.

The importance and history
of obviousness
Since modern patents were first granted in
the 17th century, governments were faced
with the conundrum of “drawing a line
between the things which are worth to the
public the embarrassment of an exclusive
patent, and those which are not” [3].
Patents were established as incentives for
inventors to spend time and money developing new inventions. Without some rights
to prevent others from copying their inventions once they were first sold—so the
economic theory goes—developers would
not undertake the ardor of research in the
first instance. But this right to exclude
others from practicing new and useful technologies was considered to be a powerful
one, and determining which inventions
merited the law’s security poised no shortage of administrative, legal, and philosophical problems.
In the USA, the courts took up the
mantle of assessing the worth of new
technology under the patent laws. Like
the technologies they were charged with
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investigating, their opinions consisted of
various attempts—trials and errors—to
make workable what was otherwise an
imperfect machine. In the early part of the
19th century, courts required patented
inventions to be “of more ingenuity and
skill than that possessed by an ordinary
mechanic” [4]. Litigating genius, suffice it
to say, proved less than fruitful, so courts
adopted a variety of standards, none of
which proved any easier. By the mid-20th
century, things had deteriorated to the point
that US Supreme Court Justice Robert H.
Jackson remarked that “the only patent that
is valid is one which this Court has not been
able to get its hands on” [5].

......................................................

“In an age when good
government was widely
perceived as being one that
ushered scientific research into
the fore, Federico and Rich’s
invention of “nonobviousness”
was a both a political and
legal triumph.”
......................................................
In 1952, as part of a major overhaul of
the patent laws, Congress tasked two
prominent patent attorneys, Pasquale
Joseph Federico and Giles Sutherland Rich,
with giving form to this elusive “inventiveness” requirement. Their invention: what
we call “nonobviousness” today, the prohibition on patents covering inventions for
which the “differences between the
claimed invention and the prior art are
such that the claimed invention as a whole
would have been obvious . . . to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which
the claimed invention pertains” [6]. This
description of the question prior governments had failed to answer had numerous
advantages: It focused its inquiry on documents—the prior art in the field; it fixed
itself to a point in time—the time of the
invention; and it had an object—this hypothetical person having ordinary skill in the
patent’s art. It gave form to what before
was a formless idea. In short order, the
standard was adopted in similar form in
Europe as requiring patents to demonstrate
an “inventive step” over prior references
[7].
These standards also seemed tethered to
the way scientific research is actually
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conducted. They aspired to critically examine prior papers to assess whether the
patented invention was truly a significant
advance, much in the same spirit as Isaac
Newton’s reference to standing on the shoulders of giants. It required a concrete comparison between the elements of prior studies
and the current one—the patent on examination. And it posed these questions to a hypothetical scientist—an ordinary one in the
same field—to assess what he or she
thought. In an age when good government
was widely perceived as being one that
ushered scientific research into the fore,
Federico and Rich’s invention of “nonobviousness” was a both a political and legal
triumph.
Today, obviousness is by far the most
crucial doctrine of the patenting process. It
is the primary source of patent offices’
rejection of patent applications. And it
arises as a defense in virtually every
patent case litigated in court. In addition,
many other procedures at patent offices in
the USA and throughout the world
consider the potential obviousness of a
patent even after it may have already been
issued. For this reason, nonobviousness or
an inventive step has become “the heart of
the patent law” [7].

The obviousness inquiry in
molecular biology
Despite the improvements of the obviousness doctrine in aligning patent law with
scientific research, it has presented unique
problems for molecular biology. Unlike
other fields, such as mechanical engineering, molecular biology is considered
substantially more “unpredictable”. Given
biology’s complexity, the outcome of any
given experiment is increasingly uncertain.
Experimental trial and error—more than
design in the “dry” engineering fields—is
critical to research in biology. This complicates courts’ and patent offices’ obviousness
analyses, because even standard combinations of elements in the field routinely yield
unpredictable results. The discovery of
nonsequence-specific siRNA silencing in
gene regulation in the early 2000s serves as
but one example [8].
In other cases, standard combinations of
molecular cloning techniques may produce
synergies not expected by their researchers,
as with the production of monoclonal antibodies. The half-life of several antibodies,
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for example, can surprisingly be regulated by
developing otherwise similar constructs for
controlling fucosylation pathways. Furthermore, biology—unlike, say, physics—is not
practiced in a sterile environment. Work
conducted in molecular biology often takes
place within the medium of living cells or
complex genetic environments. As a result,
translating a technique from one system to
another frequently proves difficult. And even
where researchers seem capable of attaining
promising results, issues over experiments’
reproducibility abound. This has complicated the task of asking whether an average
molecular biologist—a “person of ordinary
skill in the art” in patent law’s parlance—
would think the invention to be “obvious” or
lack an “inventive step” over what came
before it.

......................................................

“Unlike other fields, such as

mechanical engineering,
molecular biology is considered
substantially more
“unpredictable”. . .”
......................................................
This complication has only worsened
recently. Prior to 2007, obviousness analyses almost exclusively used documentary
evidence, such as patents and articles in
scientific journals. In 2007, however, the
US Supreme Court took up the case of KSR
International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., and determined whether such a narrow focus on
patents and papers was appropriate. The
Court concluded that, in addition to the
documents traditionally considered by the
Patent Office in determining obviousness,
it should now also look to factors such as
common sense, market pressures, and the
number of possible permutations of individual elements of a given invention. In
addition, the Court rejected patent law’s
long-held axiom that obviousness could
not turn on whether an invention was
simply “obvious to try”.
Adopting these standards for laboratory
molecular biology has proven enigmatic.
Few advances in molecular biology are the
result of simple “common sense”, however
defined. And while it is, in some sense, obvious to try different laboratory techniques
across different systems, successfully getting
such techniques to work under different
conditions—even different laboratories—is
rarely easy.
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......................................................

“Few advances in molecular

biology are the result of simple
“common sense”, however
defined.”
......................................................
As a consequence, legal scholars have
long complained of obviousness’s mismatch
with biology [9]. Following the final completion of the Human Genome Project in 2003,
Dan L. Burk and Mark A. Lemley wrote
about “an increasing divergence between
the [patent] rules actually applied to different industries”, including courts having
“repeatedly held that uncertainty in predicting the structural features of biotechnological inventions renders them nonobvious,
even if the prior art demonstrates a clear
plan for producing the invention” [9].
Today, scholars have expressed concern that
recent groundbreaking advances in cloning,
sequencing, and high-throughput screening
may render even significant advances in
synthetic biology obvious under the patent
laws. The truth, of course, is that for many
biotechnologies reasonable minds could—
and often do—easily differ on whether a
new technique contains a truly “inventive
step”. Trivial improvements to some are
colossal advances to others.

The CRISPR patents
Despite these puzzles, obviousness and the
inventive step requirement are at the heart
of the CRISPR patent inquiries in both
Europe and the USA. To start with, the
patent dispute in the USA was structured as
an “interference proceeding”, a legal procedure unique to US patent law. Interferences
attempt to ascertain whether two related
patents “claim patentably indistinct subject
matter”, that is, whether they claim the
same invention and, if so, which party was
the first to invent. But if the inventions
appear to be different—if, for example, the
later invention was a nonobviousness
improvement—there is no true interference,
in fact, between the dueling inventions. In
the CRISPR interference, the US Patent Trial
and Appeal Board (PTAB) defined the invention in dispute between the University of
California and the Broad Institute as a
single-guide RNA (sgRNA) CRISPR/Cas9
editing system in a eukaryotic cell. To determine whether Zhang’s eukaryotic-specific
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invention was a nonobviousness advance
over Doudna and Charpentier’s, the PTAB
homed in on one “consistent criterion” in its
jurisprudence: Whether the invention, as
described by Doudna, “would have had a
reasonable likelihood of success”.
In practical terms, this meant that the
PTAB’s obviousness decision centered on
whether Doudna and Charpentier’s application of CRISPR/Cas9 in vitro and in bacterial
systems would have had a “reasonable likelihood of success” in eukaryotic cells. And
in doing so, they focused on testimony from
a variety of experts on a laundry list of differences among cell systems that could have
affected Cas9’s binding and nuclease activity: “gene expression, protein folding, cellular
compartmentalization,
chromatin
structure, cellular nucleases, intracellular
temperature, intracellular ion concentrations, intracellular pH, and the types of
molecules in prokaryotic versus eukaryotic
cells”. Each of these, ventured the PTAB,
“would contribute to unpredictability” in
getting Doudna and Charpentier’s invention
to work in eukaryotes. The PTAB also—and
perhaps unfairly—relied on statements made
by Doudna and her research team that
getting CRISPR to work in eukaryotic cells
was an “exciting possibility”, although no
sure thing, and that Doudna herself experienced “frustrations” in getting the system to
work in other cell types. These differences
among cell systems, combined with statements Doudna made to the media in describing the development of her invention,
convinced the PTAB that Zhang’s invention
was a nonobvious improvement over
Doudna and Charpentier. An ordinary
molecular biologist could not have a
“reasonable expectation” that CRISPR-Cas9
would work in eukaryotic cells. And as a
consequence, Zhang’s patents did not interfere with Doudna and Charpentier’s patent
application.
This decision illuminates the disjointedness between nonobviousness and how
biological research is, in fact, practiced. As a
matter of legal interpretation, the PTAB’s
description of nonobviousness is almost
certainly correct. Inventions that raise, but
do not resolve, questions about how far the
new technology can be applied do not necessarily give others a “reasonable expectation”
that the invention will work well, if at all, in
foreign systems, under different experimental conditions, or using different parameters.
The development of a biologic compound in
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one cell system using a particular construct
is famously not a guarantee that it will work
in a different cell system or using a different
construct. Indeed, the failure to move the
manufacture of biologics from one system to
another is so frequent, that there is surely
no “reasonable expectation of success” in
merely transposing a biologic construct to a
different cell system. Consequently, actual
descriptions of such efforts are, in a real
sense, nonobvious: They could not have
been predicted, without experimentation, by
an average researcher.

......................................................

“The development of a biologic

compound in one cell system
using a particular construct is
famously not a guarantee that
it will work in a different cell
system or using a different
construct.”
......................................................

And yet, this does not mean researchers
are completely at sea; biological research,
while finicky and error-prone, is not
random. Researchers are armed with a
broad arsenal of tools to combat numerous
technical problems that arise in translating
developments from one cell system to
another. Even using the PTAB’s own list of
differences between pro- and eukaryota,
common molecular biological practices exist
to mitigate each of these difficulties. For
example, differential gene expression can be
controlled by selecting appropriate promoters; protein folding can, in some instances,
be made uniform by certain optimization
techniques; chromatin structure can be
altered by histone modification; nucleases
can be blocked; temperature can be regulated; pH can be buffered; and so on. This is
not to say that researchers could have
expected that any of these techniques would
have worked in moving CRISPR-Cas9 from
bacteria to eukaryotes, or to predict which
of these techniques, in combination, would
have been successful. But Doudna and Charpentier’s work, at a minimum, provided a
clear set of paths forward to do so. To that
end, Doudna’s statements of “frustration”
concerning translating her system to eukaryotes can be read—should be read—as being
simply reflective of the uncertainties of
moving between cell systems, not doubts
that her process would have failed entirely.
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By contrast, the EPO has given great
accord to how molecular biologists actually
view uncertainty in their own field. Doudna
and Charpentier formally applied for their
European patent in August 2014. And
shortly after their application, received eight
separate challenges to their application in
the form of “Observations by Third
Parties”—scientific references and legal
argument from members of the public on
why the patent at issue should not be
granted (there is no precisely analogous
procedure in the USA). These observations,
like the PTAB’s decision, tended to focus on
the differences between what Doudna and
Charpentier disclosed in their application
and the potential difficulties in moving their
same system to living, eukaryotic cells. One
such observation—notably, from the Broad
Institute—highlighted that its own work
demonstrated that simply moving Doudna
and Charpentier’s system, as described, into
eukaryotic cells was “inoperable”. Doudna
and Charpentier’s attorneys’ responded to
such criticisms by noting that the average
level of skill in the molecular biology field
was “high” and that strategies to solve the
problems raised by the Broad Institute were
part of the “mental furniture” of any laboratory biologist [10].
In March 2017, the European Patent
Office discounted the full set of Observations
as “not relevant” to its inquiry of whether
Doudna and Charpentier were entitled to a
patent. Rather, the EPO communicated its
intent to grant Doudna and Charpentier’s
patent—even with their originally broad
claims. While the EPO did not discuss in
detail why it came to different conclusions
from its US counterpart, it did note that it
was ultimately persuaded by Doudna and
Charpentier’s attorneys’ response to such
criticisms—tethering
its
decision
of
patentability to scientific claims of disclosure
perhaps more than legal ones.

The future of obviousness in CRISPR
Conflicting decisions or otherwise, the
CRISPR patent disputes complicates how
obviousness will be assessed for CRISPR
technologies in the future. Perhaps the most
salient example concerns the discovery of
new nucleases that work with CRISPR Type
II systems. At the time of Doudna and Charpentier’s original publication in Science, only
a single nuclease—Cas9 derived from Streptococcus pyogenes—was known. Since then,
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a host of orthologs and entirely new
enzymes have been discovered, including
Zhang’s discovery of Cpf1; Doudna’s discovery, along with her University of California
colleague, Jillian F. Banfield, of CasX and
CasY, derived from uncultivated bacteria
obtained from an abandoned mine, and the
recent announcement from Korea of CjCas9
from Campylobacter jejuni. Now that such
orthologs are known—and especially
because they appear to work in currently
deployed CRISPR Type II systems as
predicted—this raises the question of
whether the application of CRISPR using
new nucleases is, in some senses, “obvious”. The answer is far from clear.
More broadly, CRISPR truly challenges
what constitutes an “inventive step” because
the ambit of the technology seems to be
limited almost only by human imagination.
Since Doudna and Charpentier’s canonical
description of CRISPR as a precise tool for
double-stranded DNA cleavage, researchers
have modified the system to induce singlestranded DNA breaks; to purposefully introduce levels of imprecision to DNA cleavage;
to merely block DNA sequences through
competitive binding; and to use the system
as a single nucleotide editing tool. Indeed,
the value of CRISPR is not merely that it can
precisely edit DNA, but that its specificity to
DNA sequence can be used to create, report,
and analyze the genome. As a result, some
applications of CRISPR are surely major
intuitive leaps—inventive steps by any other
name—such as the recent development of
“gene drives”: CRISPR mediated extinguishing of heterozygosity such that a single allele
is “driven” through the population. And yet,
these advances are, by and large, combinations of known tools in the CRISPR-space
that have predictable outcomes when
deployed. Obviousness’s insistence that we
would treat such advances under patent law
differently from how they are perceived in
the field is puzzling.
By the same token, the yet-to-be-demonstrated clinical success of CRISPR therapies
in humans is incredibly uncertain. Taking
the PTAB’s metric for assessing Doudna and
Charpentier’s US patent application, no clinician has a “reasonable expectation of
success” that any given therapy will work.
Most clinical trials, in fact, fail. This strongly
suggests that the developments of human
CRISPR therapies, writ large, will have to
overcome obviousness hurdles. And yet,
their success will likely turn on predictable
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applications of known CRISPR techniques to
human patients. Here, too, CRISPR challenges our notions of both obviousness and
expectations of success.
As is true with any groundbreaking technology, it is impossible to predict how
CRISPR will develop in the future. But as it
develops, molecular biologists’ techniques
to work with the system—and their understanding of what is likely to be successful
and what is not—will undoubtedly mature.
Dynamically aligning these future advances
with patent law’s obviousness requirement
will remain an incredible challenge.

Lessons about science and society
This story about research and the obviousness requirement demonstrates a broader
disconnect between science and the law—
even law concerned with assessing science.
And there are broader lessons about what
the CRISPR dispute can—and cannot—tell
us about science in general. Doudna and
Charpentier clearly invented something.
Zhang did too. Nonetheless, the patent
system struggles to give appropriate credit
to researchers depending on their relative
contribution to the field. To use an analogy
from physics, scientific advance is chromatic—but it is not quantized. Small scientific contributions are still, of course,
contributions. Patent doctrines, on the other
hand, are like elections for parliamentary
ridings: Prizes are awarded only to the first
past the posts the law erects, whether they
are grounded in contemporary science or
otherwise.
We should not let the outcomes of patent
disputes teach us lessons about whether, or
to what degree, scientific contributions are
significant to their respective fields. We all
stand on the shoulders of giants. And while
in the course of research, some will
undoubtedly stand taller, the goal is to
always see farther than our horizons, even if
only by inches.
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